Limits of free speech and the tole of ISPs
1.1 Freedom of speech deserves constitutional protection in all modern democracies. However, the legal limits of free speech are not the same on both sides of the Atlantic. Racist speech constitutes the most striking and the most controversial example. It is tolerated in the US where it takes advantage of the shelter provided by the First Amendment of the Constitution 2 . On the contrary, it is banned in most European countries where it is a criminal offence and is prosecuted as such.
Not only history but also political philosophy account for this divergence. US constitutional law regards racist speech as a variety -however disgusting, dangerous and extremist -of political opinion and denies both the States and the Federal bodies the power to interfere with such kind of public debate. This regime is based upon the libertarian philosophy of government non-interference with individual 1
We would like to warmly thank Dr. Christian Sandvig, Markle Fellow at the Program in Comparative Media Law & Policy, for his thorough and constructive comments on this paper and for having accepted the fastidious task of helping us with our English writing. It goes without saying that we take full responsibility for the content of this paper. liberty 3 . It has been established during the past forty years while the Supreme Court has largely eradicated most forms of public censorship 4 . The European approach, stated in article 10 of the Convention for the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms, is fairly different. The European Court has persistently emphasised freedom of expression as one of the essential foundations of a democratic society and as one of the basic conditions for its progress and for "each individual's self-fulfilment". It is applicable not only to "information" or "ideas" that are favourably received or regarded as inoffensive or as a matter of indifference, but also to those that offend, shock or disturb. Such are the demands of that pluralism, tolerance and broadmindedness without which there is no "democratic society". 5 Nonetheless, freedom of speech is not absolute in Europe. It is a qualified right, that "carries with it duties and responsibilities" and "may be subject to formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties". 6 This narrower conception is shared by most of the other democratic countries, including Australia, Canada and Japan.
Restrictions and penalties mentioned in article 10 apply to racist speeches and some other questionable speeches that threaten, deny or even lead to the destruction of human dignity and integrity. They are proscribed in many European countries and are given no protection whatsoever by the European Council's institutions. Article 10 of the European Convention for the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms. The entire provision reads as follows: Cyberspace is a global forum where national territory is of little relevance. "As far as the Internet is concerned, not only is there perhaps 'no there there', the 'there' is everywhere where there is Internet access." 16 When one logs on to a Website, one does not really pay attention to the location of the site. Most of the time, the user does not even know where it is hosted. What does really matter for the Internet surfer is to find the information he or she is looking for.
The perspective of a government is quite different. Since its jurisdiction is confined to a national territory, it cannot efficiently control Websites and other data posted on the Internet from outside its borders. Consider a German prosecutor who would take legal action against an unlawful racist message, accessible from any computer in Germany provided with a network connection. Assume that this message was posted by an American citizen on a Website hosted in the US. In such a case, the prosecution is most probably doomed to failure because German prosecutors lack jurisdiction in the US. Moreover, the questionable content is there under the protection of the First Amendment of the Constitution.
1.4 While going after the content provider is not always possible, a more successful strategy is to put pressure on the ISPs in charge of the communication process. A public authority can issue injunctions to national access providers or even to large foreign hosting providers as soon as they have business interests or a subsidiary operating in Europe. It is therefore tempting for governments to try to recover some control over the Internet at the expense of the ISPs. On the other hand, most of the governments want to stimulate the growth of the "information society" and e-business. They are not ready to impose too many burdens on the ISPs. But, in Europe, they count on the ISPs to play their part in "co-regulation" of the Internet, which implies an original mixture between self-regulation and government intervention. On the whole, the ISPs are far from being pleased to play such a role. Controlling the content of the messages they host or give access puts them in an uncomfortable position. The access providers in particular argue that they should be treated as a "common carrier" of goods or as telephone carriers. These are usually not asked to check the content of the goods transported or the conversations held through their networks.
1.5 The current situation has created a great uncertainty. Legal proceedings have been launched and have led to interesting and sometimes surprising judicial rulings. Both in the US and in the European Union, parliaments have responded to the problem.
This paper aims at weighing the ISPs' duties against the liabilities they are subject to. We shall first examine recent cases that have involved major ISPs in Europe. Then, we shall review the legislative rules set up both by the US Congress and by the institutions of the European Union. Finally, we will consider the effects these new rules might have. In other words, which attitude are transatlantic ISPs likely to adopt towards questionable content in the next few years? 2 US ISPs facing European court injunctions: three topical cases 2.1 In recent years, some major ISPs like CompuServe, Yahoo and America On-Line, faced civil or criminal proceedings related to questionable content, especially pornographic or racist materials they hosted or gave access to.
2.2 The first major case arose in Germany and affected the German subsidiary of CompuServe, in particular its managing director, Mr. Somm. The facts were as follows. The US company CompuServe Inc. hosted newsgroups of a paedophile nature on its news server. Its 100% German subsidiary, CompuServe GmbH, allowed German subscribers to access these newsgroups at a local dial up rate by providing them with dial-in nodes and telecommunication lines. However, there were no contractual relationships between CompuServe GmbH and the customers. The American company was the only one to have such relations with the German subscribers. As we shall see, the German authorities chose not to prosecute CompuServe Inc. and its directors in the US.
Following a search, the investigating German police officers selected five pornographic newsgroups involving children as examples for the existence of newsgroups whose names unequivocally designated child pornography to the personal notice of Mr. Somm. As his company did not have the technical ability to cut off access to the newsgroups, Mr. Somm forwarded the list to CompuServe Inc. with a request to remove the newsgroups at stake. The American company blocked said newsgroups. Then, the German police handed over to Mr. Somm a list indicating sentations which were accessible for the customers of CompuServe Inc. in Germany. Again, Mr. Somm passed on the list to the parent company and requested blocking or deletion. For two months, CompuServe Inc. blocked the majority of the newsgroups on the list. Afterwards, the company and Mr. Somm stated in electronically accessible letters that they did not feel obliged to intervene further since CompuServe now provides a control tool called 'Cyber Patrol -Parental Control' free of charge. This control software, which was also available in a German language version, enabled subscribers to block themselves the access to whatever newsgroups they chose.
This did not satisfy the German prosecutor since the safeguard program did not block public access to hard pornography and paedophilia. Mr. Somm was accused of facilitating access to violent, child, or animal pornographic content stored in explicitly named newsgroups for hard pornography and participating in a criminal offence (i.e., negligent violation of the German Act on the Dissemination of Publications Morally Harmful to Youth). In the end of the pleadings, the state prosecutor petitioned the court to acquit the Defendant because on the facts of the case, he could not be held criminally liable. Nonetheless, on the 15 th of July 1998, the Amtsgericht München convicted Mr. Somm to two years suspended prison sentence, three years' probation and fined him 100,000 marks for the distribution of child pornography and other illegal materials.
In 1999, the Landgericht München reversed this ruling and acquitted Mr. Somm. The appeal Court gave him the benefit of the exemption of liability provided by par. 5 (3) of the 1997 German Teleservices Act (TDG). The Court decided that the manager was not at fault because he was not technically able to remove the newsgroups and because he made all reasonable efforts to transmit the request to the parent company. 17 2.3 The next dramatic case involved Yahoo! Inc.. Decided in May 2000 by Parisian judge Jean-Jacques Gomez, it has led to both concern and interest in the US.
Contrary to the Compuserve case, the matter here was addressed in a civil trial 18 and the US parent company was directly involved. 19 Two French Non-Govern-mental Organisations (NGOs) fighting against racism and anti-Semitism complained that Yahoo! Inc. was allowing the sale of thousands of pieces of Nazi memorabilia through its online auction service 20 , while in France 21 the sale of Nazi-related items is regarded as a criminal offence. The auction site was hosted in the US but could of course be accessed from France. Yahoo! Inc. was also blamed for hosting several antiSemitic pages on Geocities 72 , where one could find, inter alia, Mein Kampf and The Protocols of the Hilders of Zion.
Under the threat of a 100.000 FRF daily penalty 16.000 Euro), the Court ordered Yahoo! Inc. to take all appropriate measures in order to prevent French Internet surfers or people located on the French territory from accessing auction sales of Nazi items, and more broadly from accessing any other site or service that promotes Nazism or denies Nazi crimes. 23 In addition to challenging the French court's jurisdiction and calling upon the First Amendment protection, Yahoo! Inc. objected that it was technically not feasible to put such measures into place because it was impossible to trace the users' nationality. And, even if such measures were possible, the high implementation cost would put the company at risk.
In November 2000, Judge Gomez took an additional decision based on a report by international experts. 24 These experts considered that "nearly 70% of IP addresses allocated to French surfers can be linked with certainty and be filtered." For the other 30%, they were of opinion that a "declaration upon honour of his nationality by the user" could achieve a significant filtering success rate. The Judge gave three months to Yahoo! Inc. to implement such measures.
These French decisions did not remain without consequences. Under pressure from US lobbies, Yahoo! Inc. banned hate-related goods (Nazi and KKK items in particular) from its auction site and removed numerous pro-Nazi WebPages from Geodties. 25 At the same time, Yahoo! Inc. started charging users to post items on the auction der to issue to all Internet surfers a warning informing them of the risks involved in continuing to view the pro-racist sites. site. 26 The company said that the decision to remove the controversial goods had nothing to do with the French judge's injunction, however. Concurrently, Yahoo! Inc. filed a counter-suit in a federal dictrict court, San José, California, requesting that the French decisions be declared void under the First Amendment of the US Constitution. The company also contested the French rulings on two grounds: first, that it is technically impossible to block access using filtering systems and second, that the French court has overstepped its jurisdiction, in other words that it should not be able to impose its national laws on a US company.
In November 2001, the US District Court issued the declaration Yahoo! Inc. was looking for, i.e., that the First Amendment of the Constitution that embodies the right to free speech precludes enforcement within the US of the French ruling. 27 The two French NGOs that launched the proceedings in France have appealed this decision and contended that Yahoo! Inc. should not be shielded from French law by the First Amendment. They are unlikely to succeed because of the legal principles that prohibit the enforcement of foreign judgments when the latter are contrary to the public policy of the forum. 28 Other actions brought against Yahoo! Inc. in various European countries did not lead to the same result as the French rulings, either. In March 2001, a German court announced that it would not prosecute the company in relation to the Internet auction of Nazi items, otherwise illegal to sell conventionally, because the online portal is not liable for the legality of items posted for sale on its Websites. While Germany has some of the strongest laws against hate literature in the world, the German court reportedly recognised Yahoo! Inc. as an ISP and, as such, ruled that the company should not be held liable for the content of its auction Websites. 29 2.4 As one could expect, the Yahoo! ruling caused human rights activists to take further action before the French Judiciary. J'accuse! (an association aimed at eradicating racism on the Internet and named after Zola's famous paper in the Dreyfus case) filed a case 30 The ISPs claimed that they should not be responsible for monitoring their users' behaviour arguing that they are "only carriers" and that they "cannot become the police". "Controlling or limiting citizens' access to the Internet is a prerogative which only belongs to public authorities", they said. 32 The ISPs also claimed that their efforts to develop self-filtering techniques were sufficient. Jean-Jacques Gomez, the same Judge that presided in the Yahoo! case, handled the proceedings in a very unusual way. At the end of the first pleadings, he decided to reopen the debates and asked the parties to choose what he called "great witnesses", "in order to deepen and broaden the discussion on all factual, ethical and technical sides". Debates in the courtroom took place during two days 33 -unusual 33 At the request of the complainant, the following witnesses were heard, inter alias: three legal experts, according to whom filtering is technically feasible, but complex and never perfect; a popular philosopher, Alain Finkelkraut, who asked for a coming of the law on the Internet the director of the weekly Nouvel Observateur, Laurent Joffrin, who criticized the access providers' defence. He said that neutrality is not acceptable when facing racism and compared their role to the trains that conveyed the Jews to the concentration camps during World War Π; a Civil Servant from the Ministry of National Education; a professor at the renowned Sorbonne, a sociologist at the Centre Nationalpour la 'Recherche Saentifique (which is the French national body supporting research). human rights. 34 The ruling gave ten day notice to the hosting provider of Front14.org, the US company SkyNetWeb Ltd (which refused to take part in the proceedings), to say what measures it intends to take to rectify the situation.
However, Gomez seemed reluctant to go one step further than in the Yahoo! case, especially regarding access providers. In his ruling, the Judge neither condemned the access providers nor issued formal injunction against them. He asked them to "freely" determine which measures they consider necessary and possible as to prevent Front 14 from pursuing its illegal activity. He said that at present "there is no law under which access providers are compelled to filter the access on the Net". In fact, the French Parliament is currently discussing the Information Society Act that intends to give to the Judge of emergency proceedings (i.e, the juge des référés) the power to order all necessary measures to stop any breach of French law caused by online services. The New French Act on the Information Society (Loi sur la société de l'information) is likely to empower the judge dealing with emergency proceedings (Président du tribunal de grande instance) to order ISPs to take all appropriate measures which are necessary to cease an infringement caused by online services, including cutting access to them (new article 43-8-3 to be added to the 1986 Freedom of Communication Acìj.
In his opinion, judge Gomez nevertheless stressed the risks of the situation. He compared the Internet to a nuclear power plant working out of control in the centre of the city and asked for legislative intervention.
In Switzerland, the Front 14 Nazi gateway was dealt with in a different way. The NGO Aktion Kinder des Holocaust managed to convince the federal police to put the gateway on the "black list" which is voluntarily blocked by Swiss ISPs. This seems to be the usual practice in Switzerland. 35 Meanwhile Front14.org has disappeared from the Web altogether (at least, under this name), allegedly owing to an attack by hackers. 36 3 Immunity and liability limitations of ISPs in US law 3.1 Even in the US, the ISPs have been challenged for unlawful content they were hosting or giving access to. In 1995, the its bulletin boards called Money Talk, which at the time was the leading and most widely read financial computer bulletin board in the US. The message accused the two plaintiffs, a securities investment banking firm (Stratton Oakmont, Ine) and its president of committing criminal and fraudulent acts in connection with a public stock offering. The Court held that Prodigy should be regarded as the publisher of the libel and not as a mere distributor because a paid employee monitored the bulletin boards. In the opinion of the court, this editorial control through an agent meant that Prodigy could not be considered as a mere "passive conduit". According to the court, Prodigy assumed an effective editorial control by its stated policy that it was a family oriented computer network. 3.2 The extent to which ISPs were put in the frontline of judicial proceedings gave rise to great concern. The legislature of the United States of America and the parliament of the European Union decided to take the problem into their own hands. One of their aims was to avoid undesirable judicial rulings and legal uncertainty that could stand in the way of the "information society" and slow down "e-business". In the US, the legislature's position was so strong as to prevent any State or Federal regulation from interfering with the development of the Internet or from having a "chilling effect" on freedom of speech on the network.
In this context, the US Congress overruled the Stratton Oakmont ruling without any delay. In the Communication Decency Act (CDA)
of 1996, the ISPs were sheltered from detrimental torts. Section 230 (c) (1) of this Act immunises providers of interactive computer services from civil liability in tort with respect to material disseminated by them but created by others. The ISPs are therefore exempt from any editorial liability for content they host or give access to:
"No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as publisher or speaker of any information provided by another content provider"?'*
If not overturned, the Stratton Oakmont decision would have certainly discouraged the ISPs from managing the material they were hosting. By implementing a content policy, they would have exposed themselves to the strict liability standards normally applied to original publishers of defamatory statements. An important purpose of section 230 was therefore to remove the disincentives to self-regulation cre- providers for copyright infringements. This clause codifies the terms of an agreement (referred to as the Washington agreement), which was negotiated between copyright holders and online intermediaries. The DMCA is less favourable to the ISPs than the general immunity regime. It sets up cases of liability exemptions, which put new duties on ISPs. The hosting provider is exonerated from any direct or vicarious liability for copyright infringements whose content it is hosting providing that it meets three cumulative conditions 47 : 1. The host must have no knowledge that the hosted content is infringing or must not be aware of facts or circumstances from which infringing activity is patent; 2. If the provider has the right and ability to control the infringing activity, it must not receive a financial benefit directly attributable to the infringing activ-
ity;
3. And finally, upon receiving proper notification of claimed infringement, the host must "act expeditiously to remove or disable access to the material". 48 With respect to this third condition, the statute implements the so-called notice and take down procedure. When a copyright holder discovers that his or her right has been infringed, he or she must formally notify the infraction to the ISP's designated agent. The ISP must then remove the material or disable access to it quickly, otherwise it could be liable for damages. It must also promptly notify the subscriber that it has removed or disabled access to the material. The subscriber may then dispute the validity of the notice and send a formal counter notification to the ISP. In that case, the ISP has to inform the complainer that it will put back the controversial data in 10 business days, unless the complainer filed an action against the content provider seeking a court injunction.
This procedural mechanism is ingenious because it opens the door to an amiable settlement of the conflict, without putting the ISP in the position of a judge who has to decide if the controversial data are infringing or not.
Liability limitations of ISP's in European law
4.1 In Europe, the matter was handled by the European Union in its Directive on ecommerce 49 , which was due to be implemented by the Member States before the 17 th of January 2002. 50 The European regime of liability limitations is much more balanced than the CDA immunity clause. It also leaves more room for state intervention, a position that is consistent with the European approach to freedom of speech as a qualified right. With respect to ISP liability, the European Directive was largely modelled upon the 1997 German Tekservices ActHowever, the European provisions put slightly more burden on the ISPs in comparison with the former German statute. 52 Far from seeking to harmonise national laws by setting common standards of liability, the Directive primarily intends to set up "liability havens", i.e., cases where the ISPs are exempted from direct and vicarious liability both at the civil and at the criminal level. 53 4.2 As a matter of principle, the Directive states in article 15, that the European Member States should neither impose a general obligation on the ISPs to monitor the information which they transmit or store, nor a general obligation to actively seek illegal activities on the network. But the Member States may compel the ISPs to promptly inform the public authorities about illegal data or infringements reported by recipients of their services. They may also oblige the ISPs to communicate information enabling the identification of their subscribers at the request of public authorities. Undoubtedly, the Directive seeks to stimulate co-regulation, i.e., some kind of collaboration between the ISPs and the public authorities. In this line, the Directive explicitly mentions the possibility for national courts or administrative authorities to enjoin both the access providers and the hosting providers to prevent or to put an end to a breach of the national law in accordance with Member States' legal system (art. 12.3 and 14.3). In any case, the European service providers will have to block questionable data when asked to do so. In this respect, the administrative authority of European countries in general, and the police body in particular, are usually entitled to give such an injunction.
As regards to what the Directive calls "mere conduit", which covers inter alias access providing activities, article 12 states that the provider will not be liable for information transmitted on condition that he plays only a passive role. However, while in the US the scope of the regime is strictly limited to copyright infringements, in Europe it applies to all breaches of the law, as, for instance, the legal consequences of defamation or of hate speech. Moreover, the US provision established a formal "notice and take down" procedure, while the European Directive does not specify the essential information that such a notification should include, leaving the matter to be settled by agreements between business operators through codes of conduct. Furthermore, no "put back procedure" is set up or even mentioned in the European Directive. Despite these important differences, the US DMCA and the European general provisions share a common spirit. While it appears difficult, if not impossible, to reach substantial common standards regarding content control on the Internet, it seems much easier to adopt common procedures that may lead to similar results or, at the very least to a cease-fire with the business operators.
Likely effects of the new European rules on transatlantic Internet services

5.1
The "notice and take down" system is a good example of the new model of governance that characterises globalisation. It implies a double shift from substantial to procedural regulation andfrom States' regulation to global co-regulation. But even if this system shows that a bring-ing together of the US and Europe is achievable through the adoption of common procedures, it is far from being a panacea with respect to free speech. This system will probably stimulate and facilitate the removal of illegal content from the Internet. ISPs will be anxious to preserve the liability limitation provided by statute and therefore will act expeditiously when being notified of any infringement. It is also possible that in the long run the most important ISPs will avoid hosting or giving access to material that appears questionable, unorthodox or disturbing so as to secure their reputation in the market. This may lead to politically correct or even economically correct unofficial standards that may constitute an informal but quite efficient mechanism for content-based private censorship. In this case, the First Amendment protection may be formally upheld while freedom of speech would no longer be effectively guaranteed.
Such an outcome is not simply speculative. The current situation is comparable to the regime of press control adopted in several European countries in the 19 th century -for instance in the Netherlands, including Belgium from 1815 to 1830. This system was aimed at controlling the press while the Constitution formally guaranteed the freedom of expression and abolished censorship. Printers were required to pay a deposit as a kind of warranty in case they would be held liable for writings they had published. This was most effective for the Government in place because few printers dared to take any financial risk by publishing questionable material. This private censorship seems to have been even more severe than the previous regimes of government censors.
A similar situation could prevail on the Internet in the near future. The combination of the American "Good Samaritan provision" 55 and the European conditional exemptions of liability create a compelling incentive for ISPs to remove any controversial material whenever they are informed by an authority or even informally notified that a Website, a bulletin boards or a newsgroup they are hosting contain unlawful, infringing or otherwise controversial material.
5.2 This new legal environment will then probably produce two normatively opposite effects. On the one hand, it will provide public authorities and human rights activists with better tools to limit the influence of racist, Nazis, anti-Semitic and 54 CDA 47 U.S.C. § 230 (c) (2) (A) <http://www4.law.cornell.edu/uscode/47/230.
html > (last visited on January 25, 2002). 55 In addition, contractual provisions generally allow the hosting provider to freely remove or disable access to any material that appears controversial in one way or another.
other kind of hate speeches on the Internet. On the other hand, this might be the slippery slope to indiscriminate private censorship. The willingness to exploit these new tools is certainly clear in Germany where public authorities have recently taken new actions against racist and Nazi material hosted by American ISPs. In May 2001 and again in January 2002, the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (Bundesamt für den Verfassungsschutz) has notified Ebay Inc., a California company which runs the world largest shopping Website, about the sale of Nazi-related songs, books, clothing and paraphernalia on its "marketplace". Each time, Ebay reacted to the notice and promptly disabled access to the controversial items. In addition, the company formally declared that it "will no longer host the sale of memorabilia from the Nazi period or anything related to fanatical groups." 56 The recent steps taken by J. Biissow, the President of the Government of the County (Regierungsbezirk) of Düsseldorf, are signs of the same tendency. Not only has he challenged US ISPs to help combat neo-Nazi propaganda on the Internet 57 , but, under the threat of an up to 500,000 mark fine, he has also ordered access service providers established on its territory to block access to a number of Nazi and racist sites based in the US. Internet surfers logging on through these ISPs have been redirected to the government Website when trying to access the banned US sites. Such a firm attitude has not been unanimously welcomed within Germany. The measures implemented by J. Büssow have been criticised as akin to censorship. 58 In the case of hate speech, the European regime of conditional liability exemption and the "notice and take down" procedure may work as an efficient tool to enforce the rule of international law on the Internet. Indeed, article 20-2 of the 1966 U.N.'s International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights prescribes that "any advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence shall be prohibited by law". The US have made explicit reservation about this provision because of the First Amendment of its Constitution. But, as we have seen, American hosting providers are likely to obey this rule in order to benefit from the liability incentive provided by the European legislation. Hate speech could thus be banned to a large extent in the US regardless of the American Constitution.
5.3
The compelling incentive to censure created by the combination of the ecommerce Directive and the "Good Samaritan provision" will not only apply to items that promote racism, Nazism, paedophilia or other obviously illegal data. It will also affect other material, otherwise legitimate, that is controversial for any reason.
Under the current legal provisions, ISPs are strongly encouraged to quickly remove any material when notified, even informally, by any third party that these data are infringing, defamatory, dangerous, seditious, inaccurate or otherwise illegal or damaging. This situation generates an obvious "chilling effect" on freedom of speech on the Internet, which is not consistent with the protection guaranteed by Article 10 of the European Convention on human rights.
The European regime concerning ISP liability should then be amended by law or supplemented by self-regulation in order to avoid this institutionalisation of massive private censorship. In particular, the "notice and take down" procedure should be improved in a way that could better protect the rights of the content provider. The procedure should be at least counterbalanced by a "notice and put back procedure" (such as in the DMCA) that will relieve the ISPs of the decision to remove the controversial data and give it back to the parties themselves or to a judge, if they fail to reach an agreement.
Conclusion
The heroic idea that cyberspace should remain free from any regulation cannot be seriously sustained. In recent years, public authorities have partially succeeded in conscious attempts to enforce the rule of law on the Internet. While international efforts to reach common standards and cooperation remain modest, some progress has been made especially in the area of child pornography and copyright infringement. But for the most part, public authorities have focused on the enforcement of their own legal rules. In this respect, European policy has been mainly oriented towards Internet services providers, seeking their cooperation in the search for and the removal of illegal material. Under the threat of being fined or held liable for damages by national court rulings, ISPs as business operators, are eager to take advantage of the conditional exemption of liability regime in the new e-commerce Directive by taking down unlawful data when being enjoined or even informally notified to do so. After the Yahoo! case major American ISPs that were at first reluctant to commit themselves to censorship now seem ready to remove or disable access to controversial material that is prohibited by European standards but hosted in the US -despite the protection offered by the First Amendment of the American Constitution. Human rights activists are now in possession of more efficient weapons to fight the spread of hate and racist speech on the Internet. However, the "notice and take down" system equally affects other kinds of controversial or unorthodox speech that fully deserve to be protected. The current alliance between state policy and business interests creates a serious risk of massive and arbitrary censorship, which is not consistent with the protection allowed to speech by the European Convention for the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms. It is not enough to get the ISPs to do the job of the police, it is also necessary to give them guidelines defining the limits of the right to free speech and offering procedural guarantees against censorship. Business operators, even stimulated by economic incentive, should never be entrusted with these principles, which belong to the very core of the human rights of a democratic people.
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